

with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE OIL CRISIS

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, there has been a great deal of anticipation today on what OPEC might do. For those of you who do not recall the sequence, several weeks ago, our Secretary of Energy went over to OPEC, encouraging them to increase production. The concern was that we were approximately 56-percent dependent on imported oil. A good portion of that came from OPEC. As we saw with the Northeast Corridor crisis on heating oils, there was concern over the availability of adequate supplies of crude oil. It appears that we are using somewhere in the area of 2 million barrels a day more in the world than are being produced currently. That sent a shock through the oil marketeers and resulted in our Secretary going over to OPEC and meeting with the Saudis and urging them to increase production.

They indicated they were going to have a meeting on March 27, which is today, and would respond to us at that time. The Secretary indicated that this was a dire emergency, that oil prices were increasing and the East Corridor was looking at oil prices in the area of nearly one and a half dollars and he needed relief now. The OPEC nations—particularly the Saudis—indicated they would address it at the March 27 meeting. So, in other words, the Secretary was somewhat stiff-armed.

Well, the Secretary, as you know, went to Mexico and encouraged the Mexicans to increase production. The Mexicans listened patiently, but they reminded the Secretary that last year when oil was \$10, \$11, \$12, \$13 a barrel, and the Mexican economy was in the bucket, where was the United States? The Secretary indicated we would help Mexico out with the tesobonos, ensuring that they would be bailed out. But to make a long story short, we didn't get any relief from Mexico.

Well, today, we didn't get any relief from OPEC. OPEC said they would address it tomorrow. So the question of whether or not we are going to get relief, I think, points to one thing: We have become addicted to imported oil. We are like somebody on the street who has to have a fix. The fix is more imported oil. And when the supply is disrupted, we look at what it takes to get more.

Well, it takes maybe a higher payment, a shortage of supply. It makes the price go up. That is the position we are in. I encourage my colleagues to look very closely at what OPEC does tomorrow—indeed, if they do anything—because what they have been doing so far is cheating. Who have they been cheating on? They have been

cheating, in effect, on themselves at our expense because last year they agreed to cut production. They developed a discipline within OPEC to cut production back to 23 million barrels per day. But they did not keep that commitment. They are currently producing 24.2 million barrels a day. That is about 1.2 million over the agreement.

So if they come up tomorrow and announce they are going to come out with a million and a half barrels a day increase, that isn't a million and a half barrels net; the net is 300,000 barrels a day. So we better darn well look at that arithmetic. If they come up with 2 million barrels a day, that is relief, in a sense, but in the last year our demand increase has been a million and a half barrels a day in addition, and I did not take into account my arithmetic. Remember, we are not the only ones in the world who consume oil from OPEC. Those other countries are going to have to share in whatever increased production comes out.

So it is indeed a rather interesting dilemma that we find ourselves in as we now are dependent 56 percent on imported oil. The Department of Energy tells us that in the years from 2015 and 2020, we will be 65-percent dependent on imported oil. Well, some people say you learn by history. Others say you do not learn very much. Obviously, we have not learned very much.

There is one other factor I think the American people ought to understand. Where has our current increase been coming from? It has been coming from Iraq. Last year, we imported 300,000 barrels a day from Iraq. Today, we are importing 700,000 barrels a day from Iraq. Today, the Department of Commerce lifted some sanctions off of Iraq to allow the Iraqis to import from the United States certain parts so they could increase—these are refinery parts—refining capacity by 600,000 barrels a day in addition.

So here we are, importing 700,000 barrels a day currently from Iraq. Some people forgot we fought a war over there not so many years ago—in 1991. What happened in that war? We lost 147 American lives; 423 were wounded in action, and we had 26 taken prisoner. In addition, the American taxpayer took it. Where did he take it? He took it in the shorts because since the end of the Persian Gulf war in 1991, just to contain Saddam Hussein and keep him within his boundaries, the cost of enforcing the no-fly zone and other things is costing the American taxpayer \$10 billion.

So here we are today looking at OPEC for relief, allowing them to get parts for their refineries so they can increase production. Here we are depending and begging and passing the tin cup for OPEC production. The answer lies in decreasing our imports on foreign oil and, as a consequence, pro-

ducing more oil and gas in the United States. We can do it safely. We have the American technology. We have the overthrust belt, the Rocky Mountains, Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, Montana, Louisiana, Texas, those States that want OCS activity.

My State of Alaska is perfectly capable of producing more oil. We produce nearly 20 percent of the total crude oil; it used to be 25. We have the technology. We know how to open up the Arctic areas and make sure the animals and the character of the land are protected because we only operate in the wintertime. Our roads are ice roads. They melt in the spring. There is no footprint. If there is no oil there, there is no footprint of any kind. We can do that in these areas. But as a consequence, we have to look for a solution.

I hope my colleagues really pick up on this. If OPEC does increase production, there are going to be those who claim victory, that we got relief. But it is going to be a hollow victory because that victory simply says our Nation becomes more dependent on imported oil. I think most Americans are waking up to the reality that that is a very dangerous policy. To suggest we got caught by surprise—I will conclude with two little notes. In 1994, Secretary of Commerce Brown requested that the independent petroleum producers do an evaluation on the national energy security of this country and came to the conclusion that we were too dependent on imported oil.

Last March, Members of the Senate wrote a bipartisan letter to the Secretary of Commerce, Secretary Daley, asking for an evaluation on the national security interests of our country relative to our increased dependence on imported oil. He released that report in November. It sat on the President's desk until Friday. They finally released it in a brief overview. The conclusion was that we have become too dependent on imported sources of oil and it affects the national security of this country. What do they propose to do about it? They don't have an answer.

I will talk more on this tomorrow when we have further information on OPEC.

THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business Friday, March 24, 2000, the Federal debt stood at \$5,730,876,091,058.27 (Five trillion, seven hundred thirty billion, eight hundred seventy-six million, ninety-one thousand, fifty-eight dollars and twenty-seven cents).

One year ago, March 24, 1999, the Federal debt stood at \$5,645,339,000,000 (Five trillion, six hundred forty-five billion, three hundred thirty-nine million).

Five years ago, March 24, 1995, the Federal debt stood at \$4,846,988,000,000 (Four trillion, eight hundred forty-six billion, nine hundred eighty-eight million).

Twenty-five years ago, March 24, 1975, the Federal debt stood at \$505,328,000,000 (Five hundred five billion, three hundred twenty-eight million) which reflects a debt increase of more than \$5 trillion—\$5,225,548,091,058.27 (Five trillion, two hundred twenty-five billion, five hundred forty-eight million, ninety-one thousand, fifty-eight dollars and twenty-seven cents) during the past 25 years.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

SEAPOWER

• Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, over the past several years, our nation's military has become increasingly over-committed and underfunded—facing problems from recruiting and retention, to cuts in active fleet numbers and a dwindling active duty force. Yet in spite of these problems, the United States' naval power, with its fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines, life-saving Coast Guard and Merchant Marine forces, and highly skilled sailors and mariners, is the best in the world. These components are a part of one of the most technologically sophisticated defense systems in the world. In Kings Bay, Georgia, we are fortunate to be home to the greatest submarine base in the nation, Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base. During my visits there, however, I have heard time and again how detrimental the growing gap between commitments and funding has become.

I believe that by appropriating additional funds to our nation's defense system and by supporting efforts to create a larger force structure, we will resolve or at least begin to remedy some of these problems that are facing today's military forces. Since I came to the Senate in 1997, I have supported funding for procurement, research and development, and readiness. In order for the United States to retain its role as a military super power, we must pay attention to the gaps that exist today and prevent further deterioration in our armed forces. If we do not reverse this trend now, a very high price will be paid tomorrow for our collective lethargy on defense issues and for the massive under-funding of our armed forces.

Mr. President, I now respectfully request that an article from the January, 2000 edition of *Seapower* magazine be inserted into the *RECORD*, as I believe it accurately and appropriately outlines the existing gap between our commitments and resources, and effectively argues the case for remedying this situation.

Thank you.

[From *Almanac of Seapower*, Jan. 2000]

A TALE OF TWO CENTURIES

(By John Fisher)

The old century had come to an end and the United States, its armed services triumphant from victory in a splendid little war over a technologically inferior adversary, as ready to take its rightful place among the major military and economic powers of the world. A former assistant secretary of the Navy, who became a national hero in that war, was soon to become president and use his bully pulpit for, among other things, the building of a Great White Fleet that was the first step in making the United States a naval power "second to none."

That former assistant secretary, later president, Theodore Roosevelt, was a shrewd judge of human nature and a life-long student of American history. He knew that most of his fellow Americans had little if any interest in foreign affairs, or in national-security issues in general. Roosevelt himself was a staunch advocate of the seapower principles postulated by Alfred Thayer Mahan, whom he greatly admired. So to remedy the situation he helped found the Navy League of the United States in 1902, contributing significant financial as well as moral support.

There were many, of course, in the Congress and in the media—indeed, in Roosevelt's own cabinet—who were not sure that the Great White Fleet was needed. It cost too much and, despite its fine appearance, would have little if any practical value for a nation unchallenged in its own hemisphere and unlikely ever to send its sons to fight in Europe's wars, much less Asia's. Besides, there might be an occasional colonial war here and there, but the possibility of a direct war between the major powers of Europe was becoming more and more remote with each passing year.

Within less than five years the vision of a lasting peace throughout the world was demolished when the Japanese Navy shocked the world by defeating the Russian Navy in the Battle of Tsushima (27-28 May 1905), sinking eight Russian battleships and seven Russian cruisers. The Japanese fleet, which started the war a year earlier with a surprise attack on Russian ships anchored in Port Arthur, lost three torpedo boats at Tsushima.

Less than a decade later The Great War—"the war to end all wars," it was called—started in Europe. The United States remained a nonparticipant until April 1917, but then entered the war in force. U.S. seapower contributed significantly to the eventual Allied success. The joyous Armistice of 11 November 1918, however, was followed by the debacle at Versailles that sowed the seeds of World War II.

Again, America and its allies were not prepared. The United States once again stayed on the sidelines until jolted out of its lethargy by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor: That put 15 million American men and women in uniform, led to total mobilization of the U.S. economy—and of the mighty U.S. industrial base—and resulted in millions of deaths later on the unconditional surrender of both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The century was less than half over, but it was already the most violent in all human history.

This time around, some lessons were learned—but not very well, and they were not remembered very long. When North Korea invaded South Korea the United States again was unprepared—as it was a

generation later in Vietnam. The Cold War cast a nuclear shadow over the entire world for more than four decades, though, and forced the much-needed rebuilding, modernization, and upgrading of America's armed forces.

As the world enters a new century, and new millennium, those forces are the most powerful, most mobile, and most versatile in the world. Moreover, the young Americans in service today are the best-led, best-trained, and best-equipped in this nation's history. But that does not mean that they are capable of carrying out all of the numerous difficult and exceedingly complex missions they have been assigned. The victories of the past are no guarantee of success in future conflicts. And it is not foreordained that the so-called "American century" that has now ended will be extended by another uninterrupted period of U.S. economic and military dominance.

Operation Allied Force, the U.S./NATO air war over Kosovo, is a helpful case in point. The precision strikes against Serbian forces, and against the civilian infrastructure of the former Yugoslavia, eventually led to the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo and the occupation of that battered province by U.S./NATO and Russian peacekeepers. The one-sided "war" lasted much longer than originally estimated, though. It did not "stop the killings" (of ethnic Albanians), the original purpose of the war. And it left Slobodan Milosevic still in power in Belgrade.

It is perhaps inevitable that political leaders will focus almost exclusively on the "victories"—however fleeting and however gossamer—that can be claimed. The prudent military commander, though, will focus on the problem areas, the near-defeats and potential disasters, the "What-ifs" and the close calls. There were an abundance of all of these in Kosovo last year—just as there were in the war with Iraq in 1990-91.

Logistics is the first and perhaps most important of those problem areas—and the biggest "What if" as well. In both conflicts. In the war with Iraq the question was "What if Saddam Hussein had not stopped with Kuwait but continued into Saudi Arabia and all the way to Riyadh?" The answer—on this, virtually all military analysts agree—is that the war would have lasted much longer and would have cost much more in both lives and money. As it was, it took the greatest sealfit in history before the vastly superior U.S./coalition forces could defeat the previously overrated Iraqi army. That massive sealfit—more than 10 million tons of supplies carried halfway around the world—would have been impossible, though, were it not for the fact that, on the receiving end, Saudi Arabia had built a large, modern, and well-protected port infrastructure.

Logistics was not a problem in Kosovo, either—but only because the U.S./NATO air forces accomplished their mission (belatedly), and ground forces did not have to be brought in. It was a close call, though—more so than is generally realized—and the end result was due more to good fortune than to careful planning. The ports in the area that might have been available to U.S./NATO shipping are few in number, inefficient, extremely limited in their throughput capacity, and vulnerable both to sabotage and to attack by ground forces. Which is exactly why U.S. sealfit planners say that a ground war in Kosovo would have been "a logistics nightmare."

Nightmares aside, there are other problems, of much greater magnitude, affecting